Every professional experiences the moment when what they know is questioned. By implication, this moment also questions their value. That is, if they know something and are convincing to others, the professional is perceived to be valuable. On the other hand, if they do not know an important point or are unconvincing about what they do know, the professional is valued less (or not at all).

It is the way of the world, at least in knowledge positions within today’s economy.

There is another side, of course. Some people are completely convincing without the knowledge or experience to support what they advocate. Their self-confidence radiates within a room and casts a spell. People agree with this kind of person implicitly and are willing to follow him or her. Later, it may be clear that their confidence was misplaced. Then, a sense of betrayal replaces the false confidence. Convincing, yes, but (in the long term) they are not credible.

Competitive intelligence professionals routinely deal with knowledge. There are facts about the competitive environment, advanced data collection tools, powerful analytical models and insightful interviewing approaches. Awash with information, a competitive intelligence project usually ends with some type of report or presentation. Then, the facts, interpretations and recommendations are displayed for a sometimes-skeptical senior management audience. Attitudes of “convince me” and “prove it” often challenge the competitive intelligence professional’s performance and credibility. The obvious temptation is to emphasize expertise and exclude doubts, right? After all, is not humility a sign of weakness?

Unsurprisingly, there should be a balance between honest humility and expressed expertise. This balance is not contrived. Rather, it reflects what is true for most people. That is, the more that we know, the more we realize that we do not know. Put another way, whatever we know today, it will not be enough for tomorrow. Hence, we need a way to live with ourselves while delivering valuable services to others. We need to be able to explain what we do not know with as much credibility as we covey our certainties. (See my article on “The Right Answer to the Trap Question” for one approach.)

How do we do that? Here are seven guidelines that I use to balance my expertise and my humility.

One of the laments of the competitive intelligence community is how others erroneously define competitive intelligence. Left alone, others view CI as everything from spying to something that is indistinguishable from <file in the blank> (e.g., market intelligence, business intelligence, marketing, just good thinking). It is no wonder that many of us encounter skepticism, ignorance and doubt when we talk about competitive intelligence to potential clients or customers.

I would be pretty happy if I could say that all of my problems were due to those that garble the definition of competitive intelligence.  If customers would just understand what I do better, then my business would boom, my clients would prosper and the long awaited vacation home in the Colorado mountains would be a reality!

Fairness compels me to admit, however, that poor definitions are only the beginning of the issues faced by me and, perhaps, by others that practice competitive intelligence.

Another significant problem has to do with marketing competitive intelligence. (I have previously written about “The Failure of Competitive Intelligence Marketing.”) Undoubtedly, there are exceptions but my sense is that it is common for CI professionals to face difficulties in marketing their services. Why? One reason might be that previous successes are problematic to share. If I deliver outstanding insight to a client, it is reasonable for them to want exclusive access to that insight. Thus, I cannot ethically share this story to help me get my next client. Another reason might be that it is often hard to capture discrete, numerical benefits directly attributed to competitive intelligence. Testimonials help, of course, but the holy grail of benefiting a company’s bottom line is often elusive.

Finally, there is the issue of increasing personal value over time. How does a competitive intelligence professional get better at his or her job? Admittedly, there is no substitute for numerous client engagements to support on-the-job learning. Still, the absence of a well-established competency framework (though some are in work) to guide or certify professional development in the industry is a clear community weakness. In absence of a framework that has a commercial meaning (i.e., customers value the framework and use it to make buying decisions), how does a CI professional manage their own skill development? There is no lack of opportunities but how do you decide what to do. And, after taking advantage of some of those opportunities, how do you translate the improved skills into increased value for customers?

Early in my career, I supported the computers that ran a machine shop factory. The factory was a large, open room filled with machinery of every sort designed to form, cut and polish metal fixtures. I remember things about that factory. One memory is of the smell of machine oil. Another memory was of the cleanliness of the aisles between the production machines. The primary memory, however, was of the sound. When the factory was running (most of the time), there were all kinds of sounds. Drills, cutters, polishers and packaging machines were operating at the same time. Though it was possible to carry on a conversation in the factory, it was not the best place to hear or communicate important messages. Of course, overhearing conversations was just about impossible.

There were ways to get around all of this noise.

• You could take advantage of the times that the factory shut down. That removed all of the background noise. Unfortunately (if your goal was talking instead of production), this happened very infrequently.
• If you knew exactly who to talk to, you could move close to them and speak loudly. If you were the listener, the right strategy was to focus on the speaker’s words while ignoring the barrage of other sounds.
• If you wanted to “overhear” something, then the only recourse was to become involved in the conversation. That, of course, depended on the acquiescence of the other participants. Thus, you were unlikely to hear much of value accidently.

Conversely, some approaches would only make the problem worse.

• You would not want a goal of hearing everything that was being said in the factory. That would simply complicate the problem of separating an important conversation from the background machine noise. Lack of focus was a sure way to hear nothing of value.
• You would never want to amplify the sounds in the factory. Though this might increase the volume of the speaker’s voice, it would also increase the sounds from the machinery.
• You would not want to encourage people to whisper. Obviously, this made it harder to hear since the level of noise would overwhelm the conversation

Both of these lists could go on and on. They illustrate the common problem that we have of separating the important from the unimportant. The difficulty arises because every important communication is surrounded by background (i.e., contextually unimportant) noise. The world (much like the factory) is full of noise. What we want to hear is typically competing with so much that is unimportant (or less important). Furthermore, sometimes we want to “overhear” or discern things not originally meant for us. The background noise makes that task especially hard.

Thus, we get to the fundamental task in competitive intelligence. That is, targeting the signals that we desire to hear, decreasing the “volume” of the background noise and, finally, interpreting the important signals correctly.

An article in yesterday’s Wall Street Journal announced, “strategic plans lose favor” in the current economic environment. Executives, it reported, were adopting “just-in-time” decision-making according to a partner at McKinsey & Co. There is no longer time to “predict the future” and, anyway, the future was too uncertain. Now, quick adaptation and decisions were needed. Amazingly, some companies had even created “situation rooms” to monitor current events to support quicker decisions. An Accenture manager summarized by saying, “strategy, as we knew it, is dead.”

Wow. Who would have thought that we would see the death of strategy in our lifetimes?

After all, strategy has been employed in so many ventures over hundreds (thousands?) of years and now, apparently due to the recent economic issues, it is “dead.” This shocks me as much as seeing the Berlin Wall fall in 1989 or as seeing Sadat address the Israeli Knesset in 1977. Are we experiencing a radical transition to a post-strategy business era where reflexive actions completely replace strategic reflection?

I doubt it. It would be better for readers of such pronouncements to translate the death knell statements to what they really mean.